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Understanding Kant means transcending Kant. (Tillich)
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1. The Genre of Ultimate Concern 
 
A genuinely radical theology is a theological thinking that truly rethinks the deepest 
ground of theology, a rethinking that is initially an unthinking of every established 
theological ground; only through such an unthinking can a clearing be established for 
theological thinking, and that is the very clearing which is the first goal of radical 
theology. Nor can this be accomplished by a simple dissolution of our given 
theological grounds, for those are the very grounds that must here be ultimately 
challenged, and challenged in terms of their most intrinsic claims.
2
 
 
So begins Altizer’s most recent ‘call to radical theology’ – and it is under the sign of this task 
of ‘unthinking’ that I wish to position Tillich and a tradition of critical theory in what follows. 
It is a call that is echoed throughout Tillich’s works as the imperative that ‘the concrete 
contents of ordinary faith must be subjected to criticism and transformation.’3 
Altizer and Tillich repeat a Cartesian trope that lies at the kernel of modernity: 
beginnings must be destructive; they should open a space free from the orthodoxies, 
assumptions and doxa that clog up the airways of thought. To get at ‘the deepest ground of 
theology’ – which following Tillich one might call ‘ultimate concern’ or following Goodchild 
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‘piety’ – one must reorient oneself and, most especially, one’s attention. Such reorientation is 
a necessarily destructive critical enterprise. In other words, genuine criticism is the only way 
to get at theology’s ground (or unground), to get at what matters most. Moreover, when 
Altizer theologically transposes the philosophical slogan that ‘it is necessary that at least once 
in your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things’4, he problematizes the very relation 
between theology and philosophy, challenging the possibility of any determinate, hierarchal 
relation between them. This is of course a recurrent move in his oeuvre. Yet, at this juncture – 
in the very opening words of The Call to Radical Theology – it raises a specific question with 
which all the thinkers discussed in this paper find themselves confronted: whence critique? 
That is, what is the optimal discourse from within which one can embark on the critical 
project? What is the genre of critique?
5
 If criticism is inherently theological but structured 
philosophically, are those who critique philosophers, theologians or sui generis (κριτικόι)? 
These are questions recently discussed by one of Altizer’s heirs-apparent, Bradley 
Johnson, in an analysis of the above quotation. In The Characteristic Theology of Herman 
Melville, Johnson states explicitly that the reorientation of thinking to its grounds – what 
Altizer calls ‘theological unthinking’ and Johnson himself calls ‘the thinking of theology’s 
self-creation as theology’6 – necessarily occurs as ‘the ironic dissolution of genre’.7 He 
continues in a way that should remind us of Tillich’s ‘boundary’ configured as the ‘centre’ for 
‘fruitful’ thinking8, 
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My conception of theology [is] a fundamental, ontological discourse that operates 
best when emerging in the spaces between any number of discourses and 
disciplines… The interdisciplinary model I hope to exemplify is invested in that 
which is unthought in thought – i.e. its radically disrupted, repressed aesthetic-
theological excess. Only in this way does one’s thinking about theology (qua subject) 
become a theological thinking (qua Subject).
9
  
 
In other words, theology is not a self-enclosed field of discourse, but an excess (produced in 
the very act of grounding and ungrounding) that circulates through discourse. Hence, the only 
criterion for the κριτικός is not commentary on a Summa or fidelity to a church, but finding a 
place to stand that most effectively harnesses this excess (wherever that may turn out to be).
10
 
 We must also ask why it is that theology has traditionally been restrictive in this 
regard; what is it about the established field of ‘Theology’ that needs to be superceded? Again 
Johnson provides orientation: 
 
Traditional theology… begins and ends with the naming of its ultimate concern. In 
this way, it says both too much and too little… There is, of course, a crucial difference 
between a theologian, the one who names, and a philosopher, whose attention is to the 
conditions of naming itself. Indeed… perhaps only the latter, the non-theologian, can 
be truly attuned to the promise that crosses religious divides, that of a ‘new creation’ 
(or ‘enlightenment’) – the creation of a new existence.11 
 
The theologian names without attending to why, how or by what right she so names; in 
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consequence, the theologian is insufficiently attentive to ever be able to reorient thinking’s 
pieties (its ultimate concerns or deepest grounds). Which is not to say that Johnson rejects 
theology tout court; rather, he goes on to speak of ‘a new theological thinking… concerned 
with why and how the naming of the unconditioned occurs at all’ and so which practises ‘an 
active ethics of thinking embodied by the attention paid to that which is unthinkable in the 
thinkable’.12 This is a discourse that identifies itself as theological without trapping itself 
within the prison of traditional theological questions and concerns. It is concerned not just 
with names but with the conditions of possibility of naming (it is therefore critical in the 
strictly Kantian sense); yet, it also exceeds the merely philosophical insofar as its concern is 
that ground of discourse which is itself excessive (thereby ‘express[ing] the experience of 
abyss in philosophical concepts’13). On this line of thinking, the critique of pieties and the 
reorientation of ultimate concern (i.e. radical theology as defined by Altizer above) is an 
ethos, an ethics of thinking. 
 
In what follows, I trace this ethos through three manifestations of a distinct, if previously 
underexplored tradition of radical theology running through Schelling, Tillich and Goodchild. 
What all three have in common is a commitment to attend to that which matters most (piety 
or ultimate concern) and to a project of critique that radicalises the Kantian definition of the 
transcendental (‘all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode 
of our knowledge of objects’14) in order to get at that which eludes Kant’s own thought, the 
unconditional or ‘deepest theological’ values that orient personal existence. Throughout, I 
attempt to not just speak the names given for such pieties, but also describe the conditions 
that for Schelling, Tillich and Goodchild make possible this naming process at all. What is at 
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stake therefore is a genuinely critical theory. 
 
 
2. The Neo-Schellingian Tradition 
 
As an initial means of justifying my locating of Tillich in a tradition that spans back to 
Schelling and forwards to Goodchild, I provide some historical context. This context serves 
as a means of bringing out what is essential to Tillich’s Schellingianism, therefore 
provisionally justifying his place in the canon of critical theory, i.e. the development of an 
ethos of thinking that is first and foremost a matter of criticism (in the Kantian sense). 
It was as a student that Tillich first discovered Schelling’s writings: 
 
I recall the unforgettable moment when by chance I came into possession of the very 
rare first edition of the collected works of Schelling in a bookstore on my way to the 
University of Berlin. I had no money, but I bought it anyway, and this spending of 
nonexistent money was probably more important than all the other non-existent or 
sometimes existing money that I have spent. For what I learnt from Schelling became 
determinant of my own philosophical and theological development.
15
 
 
Indeed, on 26
th
 September 1954, the centenary of Schelling’s death and over forty years after 
that purchase, Tillich spoke again on what Schelling had meant to him, 
 
I felt that I could express with this speech something of the admiration I owe to my 
great teacher in philosophy and theology. He was my teacher, although the start of my 
studies and the year of his death lie exactly fifty years apart; never in the development 
                                                 
15
 Tillich, Perspectives, 142. 
6 
 
of my own thought have I forgotten my dependence on Schelling. In all times as well 
as on half-alien soils his fundamental ideas have been of help to me in all sorts of 
areas.
16
 
 
By Tillich’s own admission, then, Schelling’s thought permeates all of his own17 – but, of 
course, it was not just his own. Our understanding of the history of ideas in early twentieth-
century Europe is impoverished if it does not include the category of ‘neo-Schellingianism’ to 
describe many of the concerns of Berdiaev, Bloch, Bulgakov, Frank, Heidegger, Jaspers, 
Marcel, Rosenzweig as well as Tillich. Each thinker (and it is immediately noticeable that, in 
line with the train of thought followed in the previous section, they cannot easily be described 
as either philosophers or theologians) returned to the work of F.W.J. Schelling for inspiration. 
For, far from the mainstream view of Schelling as a pre-Hegelian relic, there emerged here a 
Schelling who – to quote Jaspers – is ‘a prototype of modern possibilities.’18 
In 1957, for example, Marcel’s ‘Schelling fut-il un précurseur de la philosophie de 
l’existence?’ set out to review this obsessive return to Schelling repeated over the past fifty 
years. He writes, 
 
If, for a form of thought that aims at rigour before anything else, Schelling cannot be 
either a master or an example; for thought that, on the contrary, regards philosophy as 
a heroic adventure entailing risks and skirting abysses, he will always remain an 
exhilarating companion, and, perhaps even, an inspiration.
19
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We must remember that Marcel and other neo-Schellingians wrote in a scholarly vacuum. 
When Tillich wrote his first doctoral thesis on Schelling in 1910, there was no book-length 
study of Schelling’s later philosophy on which he could draw. Schelling had not yet been 
domesticated by the university; instead, as the above quotation clearly implies, the wild 
Schelling of the early twentieth century stood alongside Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche as a fresh voice for the unorthodox. More specifically, for Marcel, Schelling 
‘prepared the terrain for… a renaissance of metaphysics on non-traditional foundations’, a 
renaissance sorely needed to satisfy a thinking ‘increasingly wary of the encroachment of 
legalistic categories on the one hand, and of the Hegelian temptation on the other.’20 
When it comes to identifying the elements of Schellingian philosophy that Marcel, 
Tillich and others found so appealing, a list of two items is usually given: system and 
freedom (to put it in the language of Heidegger’s 1936 course on the Freiheitsschrift). As 
Marcel makes clear in the above, neo-Schellingianism is premised on the rejection of a 
choice between neo-Kantian legalism and Hegelian metaphysics, between philosophy limited 
to the subject and speculation that ignores it. The neo-Schellingians were precisely those who 
wanted both.
21
 For Heidegger too, ‘Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this 
whole age of German philosophy’22, precisely because he thinks through the compatibility of 
system (as ‘the task of philosophy’23) and freedom (with its own peculiar ‘factuality’24).  In 
general, the neo-Schellingians are followers of Schelling to the extent they eschew the 
exclusive choice between human freedom and metaphysics. They chose both. 
Tillich’s second doctoral thesis on Schelling, Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in 
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Schelling’s Philosophical Development, stands firmly in this tradition. Mysticism is ‘the 
feeling of unity with the absolute’.25 Only on the basis of some form of affinity between man 
and God, Tillich claims, can any knowledge of God – and so a speculative theology – occur. 
Equiprimordial with this principle, however, Tillich also posits guilt-consciousness, 
‘consciousness of opposition to God… the experience of contradiction between Holy Lord 
and sinful creature.’26 Present alongside mystic union with God is always an awareness of 
unworthiness in His eyes. And this second element is the very principle most philosophical 
speculation suppresses; Schelling alone gave guilt-consciousness the status it deserved, 
according to Tillich. By acknowledging guilt-consciousness as well as identity, Schelling 
permits a moment of the irrational into his system. As Tillich writes, ‘The supreme principle 
of all reality [becomes] the identity of essence and contradiction, of the rational and the 
irrational’.27 
That is, no theology should deny man’s separation from God and radical freedom to 
sin; yet, on the other hand, no theology should use this as an excuse to sacrifice God’s 
relation with the world and the systematic speculation this makes possible. Both aspects 
(system and freedom) must be retained, and the struggle to achieve this is the struggle to 
theologise.
28
 Always, Schelling’s own successes remained normative for Tillich, providing 
the model to aspire to. Schelling’s philosophy exemplifies a ‘both…and…’ logic from which 
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results a non-dualist thinking of human freedom embedded in and commensurate with wider 
reality. 
 
* * 
 
Nevertheless, it is not merely the incorporation of system and freedom for its own sake that 
interests Tillich. When he returns to Schelling in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the real 
stakes of Tillichian neo-Schellingianism begin to emerge. Here we have Tillich’s polemical 
insistence that Schelling was ‘the predecessor of all existentialists’29, and his late Berlin 
lectures ‘the original document of existential philosophy’30, but there is also something more: 
the correlation of system and freedom is what allows the theologian to attend to the matter of 
ultimate concern itself. That is, as we have already seen at length, Schelling ‘attempts to 
return to an attitude in which the sharp gulf between the “subjective” and “objective” realms 
had not yet been created’.31 And, Tillich now emphasises, this is done in the name of 
revealing an underlying asubjective-anobjective transcendental condition of experience. 
Schelling ‘turned toward “subjectivity”, not as something opposed to “objectivity”, but as 
that living experience in which both objectivity and subjectivity are rooted… [He] tried to 
discover the creative realm of being which is prior to and beyond the distinction between 
objectivity and subjectivity.’32 Such a realm of being is ‘the Source whence springs my 
thinking and acting’.33 To locate and describe this source is the very pinnacle of criticism, for 
this is the transcendental condition that makes all of life possible. 
The correlation between man and world (freedom and system) is here recast as a 
means of accessing a further principle – piety, the primordial realm of ultimate concern which 
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orients both being as a whole and the human subject in particular. The transcendental source 
of subjective existence and objective being is the ground/abyss of all life and is obtained 
through a neo-Schellingian methodology. That is, Tillich (repeating German Idealism) 
identifies the Kantian attempt to pinpoint the psychological conditions of representation with 
the metaphysical search for grounds of being; he realises, that is, that ‘the transcendental 
stratum of knowledge corresponds to the transcendental stratum of being’34, and such a 
speculo-critical transcendental stratum is named ‘ultimate concern’. This then is one of the 
core functions of Tillichean correlation in general: the determination of ultimacy through a 
dual discourse of man and world. 
The discussion of revelation in the first volume of the Systematic Theology further 
clarifies this knot of criticism, correlation and ultimacy. Revelation is defined precisely as 
‘the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately’35, the refocusing of attention onto pieties. 
Such a process of refocusing consists in two moments (that ultimately collapse into identity): 
a ‘negative side’ of critique36 and a positive moment of speculation where there ‘opens a new 
dimension of knowledge, the dimension of understanding in relation to our ultimate concern 
and to the mystery of being.’37 It is of course the initial critical moment that concerns me 
here, a moment that is rigorously correlated by Tillich into accounts of the (objective) 
‘abysmal element in the ground of being’38 and a (subjective) ecstatic shock to the mind. In a 
paragraph that recalls the later Schelling as much as it foreshadows Goodchild’s Deleuzian 
invocation of limit-experiences, Tillich writes: 
 
The threat of non-being, grasping the mind, produces the ‘ontological shock’ in which 
the negative side of the mystery of being – its abysmal element – is experienced. 
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‘Shock’ points to a state of mind in which the mind is thrown out of its normal 
balance, shaken in its structure. Reason reaches its boundary line, is thrown back 
upon itself, and then is driven again to its extreme situation.
39
 
 
Criticism – in its Tillichian, Schellingian and Goodchildian form – takes reason beyond itself 
to its ground and abyss, as ‘the beginning of all genuine philosophy.’40 
Therefore, to limit Tillich’s neo-Schellingianism to the inventory of freedom and 
system is insufficient; indeed, it does not get at what matters most. Such an inadequate 
account tends to pigeonhole Tillich as a metaphysician attempting to provide a cosmological 
account of freedom. What I am arguing in this essay, however, is that Tillich is a critical 
thinker, and what he takes from Schelling and bequeaths (indirectly) to Goodchild is a critical 
project, a discourse that names, and describes the conditions of naming what is of ultimate 
concern. Tillich is speculative insofar as he is critical and (ultimately) he is critical insofar as 
he is speculative. For Tillich as for the German Idealists, the post-Kantian critical project 
reaches a point indistinguishable from speculation, thereby ‘abolishing the contrast between 
metaphysics and epistemology.’41 
This is (to recall the epigraph to this essay) a repetition of criticism that transcends the 
strictures placed on it in Kantian and neo-Kantian traditions. Of course, one can find plenty 
of attacks on the latter throughout Tillich’s works – from the attack on neo-Kantianism that 
opens Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness
42
 through the 1922 article on Religionsphilosophie 
(published in the Kantstudien Jahrgang) that speaks of the emptiness, formalism and fideism 
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of critical thinking
43
 to the derogatory comments that litter the Systematic Theology.
44
 Much 
of Tillich’s output should indeed be defined by ‘a protest against the methodological 
formalism of the Kantians.’45 Nevertheless, I contend, criticism tout court is not thereby 
discarded; rather, it returns in a more originary form as the description, transformation and 
amelioration of what concerns us ultimately – or, in the language of the opening to the 
Systematic Theology, the testing and interrogation of theological concepts by means of 
formal criteria for ultimacy.
46
 To put it bluntly, criticism returns as the critique of idolatry, 
where such a critique is not extrinsic to the theological enterprise but the ground from 
whence it perpetually begins again.
47
 There emerges here, therefore, a mutant form of 
criticism which is also, I will argue in the next section, the most paradigmatic form of 
criticism (‘criticism as such’) to the extent that it identifies and describes the transcendental 
condition of subjective experience and objective being that Kant misses: ultimate concern – 
or piety.
48
 
 
 
3. Criticism as Such 
 
Theology becomes critical in Tillich’s neo-Schellingianism. In order to enrich this description 
of such criticism (and the conditions of its own possibility), I now turn to Philip Goodchild’s 
Capitalism and Religion, which stands squarely in both a Schellingian and Tillichian tradition 
insofar as it conceives the task of thinking as an encounter with and reorientation of what 
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matters most. Capitalism and Religion stands under the same Marxian epigraph, ‘The 
criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism’49, that is an essential component of 
Tillich’s ‘transcending’ of Kant. Developing the tradition of critical theology further through 
Goodchild’s work enables us to note three key aspects: first, the knot that exists between 
critique and crisis (one that is verified in their etymological affinity, even if it extends beyond 
this); second, the extensity of the crisis with which the critical thinker must engage; third, the 
inextricable relation between critique and futurity. 
 A κριτικός is someone able to make judgments, i.e. someone trained in the art of 
κρίσις, for κρίσις (as we know) originally meant judgment or the act of judging. A critical 
thinker, in consequence, is also concerned with crises. She is concerned, that is, not only with 
describing the conditions of already existing crises, but also with discerning new crises for 
thought. This could perhaps suggest a breach from Tillich’s self-understanding of the critical 
project: for, surely, Tillich’s early work most often takes the form of a rejection of theologies 
of crisis (Barth, Gogarten)? And yet Tillich’s response to the dialectical theologian is always 
to radicalise and intensify the crisis – ‘to submit not only dialectically but really to 
paradox.’50 The theologian, that is, must submit completely to ‘the No’.51 At that moment, 
crisis (and so criticism) is not transcended, but enriched and deepened by ‘the positive 
paradox’, the speculative affirmation that is identical to all criticism:  
 
The theology of crisis is right, completely right, in its struggle against every 
unparadoxical, immediate, objective understanding of the unconditioned. It is no 
transition, but something permanent, an element in the essence of theology. But it has 
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a presupposition which is itself no longer crisis.
52
 
 
For Tillich, therefore, as for Goodchild and (as we shall see) for Schelling, the κριτικός thinks 
only of crises. 
Whereas the Kantian corpus responds to the crisis of metaphysics and Tillich to the 
crisis of idolatry, Goodchild’s early work similarly responds to the crisis of piety – a crisis 
which is simultaneously ecological, economic and mental.
53
 The material nature of these 
crises should not be overlooked; the critical thinker is not merely provoked by ideas, but by 
the lack (or abundance) of matter: 
 
The last insight to arrive [in writing this book] was the contemporary truth of 
suffering: a growing awareness that current trends in globalisation, trade and the 
spread of technology are not only leading towards a condition where the human 
habitat is unsustainable, but the urgency and responsibility announced by the 
preventable catastrophe mean that little else is worth thinking about.
54
 
 
The Goodchildian project cannot therefore consist merely in the identification and description 
of the conditions of these crises; it needs also to ameliorate, transform and intensify these 
conditions in the name of a better future, fusing criticism with activism. To put it bluntly, 
Goodchild’s Capitalism and Religion is nothing other than a threefold investigation into the 
possibility of a future for thought: a diagnosis of the present conditions of crisis-ridden 
thinking, a description of the future conditions necessary for renewing thought and crucially 
also an attempt to meet these conditions. This forms ‘a critical theory of piety’.55  
 According to Goodchild, piety designates the process by which we select what matters 
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most and maintain a relationship to it. Piety is ‘a determinate practice of directing attention 
towards that which matters.’56 Piety is not the only condition of thought of course, but, 
because it is the arbiter of that to which thought is ultimately directed, it is both a necessary 
and universal condition. It ‘makes a meaningful experience of the world possible.’57 Piety is a 
transcendental condition of thought, corresponding structurally almost exactly to Tillichian 
ultimacy.  
Again, we can discern that thinkers in this critical tradition do not merely imitate the 
Kantian critical project; they are in fact more critical than Kant. And this is because the crisis 
of piety (or ultimate concern) is the crisis of thought par excellence. Goodchild, like Tillich 
and Schelling before him, situates the philosopher at the site of crisis as such as a form of 
criticism as such. Moreover, criticism as such is not merely a thinking of crisis (as objective 
genitive), but thinking as crisis (the subjective genitive). Goodchild makes this particularly 
clear in the autobiographical Preface to Capitalism and Religion: 
 
Each of these [crises] fractured my self-consciousness, exposing an abyss beneath all 
my thoughts and relations to myself, to others and to the world. I became a stranger to 
those closest to me as well as to myself. Each issue imposed itself as a dynamic force 
on thought, a problem of unlimited importance that I feel barely equipped to begin to 
address… [On the one hand] the public consensus is engaged in a vast enterprise of 
evasion, sheltering in a wicked and lethal complacency. Yet each of these problems 
calls to and awakens the others. Anyone who carefully attends to the significance of 
these issue may risk having their world shattered. Thinking is nearly as dangerous as 
complacency.
58
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Criticism is a dangerous business, for it puts itself at risk to search out, utilise and redeploy 
‘dynamic forces’ liberated by the shock of catastrophe. It is not only the doxa of common 
sense but also philosophy and theology’s ‘defences and shields against the absolute’59 which 
usually protect us from such danger. To confront crisis and become a κριτικός, one must 
‘unthink’ these grounds. 
 According to Goodchild, such unthinking is to be achieved through practices of 
disorientation, such as ‘the art of cultivating ecstatic states’ or ‘an experience of the chaotic 
interval’.60 At the limit, the potencies of thought (defined as ‘the unconditioned within 
experience’61) manifest themselves in an ‘apocalyptic experience’ that finally disciplines 
attention to what matters most: 
 
Awareness is normally dim because, although it can direct attention, there is nothing 
which can reveal it as a focus of attention. The unthinkable, even though it is thought 
by right, does not normally come into thought. Piety cannot choose to indicate a 
potency. Yet potency may indicate itself. Whether in global catastrophe or in minor 
domestic cruelty, suffering is a sign that indicates an absolute: there is something that 
matters, something that motivates and empowers us.
62
 
 
In a crisis, a new, liberatory ‘ethics of thinking’63 can reveal itself, one that both attends to 
and reorients our ultimate concern. Here thought meets ‘the challenge of contemporary 
ethics… to incarnate that excess of force within reason, so that reason itself becomes a 
force.’64 And with this ideal in mind Goodchild concludes Capitalism and Religion in the 
following Tillicho-Schellingian terms, 
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The consummation of critical piety comes in the form of awareness of potency, when 
a potency indicates, dramatizes and individuates itself. Such an awareness, such a rare 
experience, empowers attention no longer to focus simply on itself but to grant 
attention to what lies outside, to that which matters. Such is the aim of philosophy.
65
 
 
* * 
 
Central to Goodchild’s conception of the critical project is the futurity of piety. Goodchild 
defines piety as ‘an orientation towards the future’66, transforming this type of critical theory 
into a thinking aware of its own future. To grasp what is at stake in this conception of 
criticism, it is crucial to recognise the role of the three Goodchildian ‘potencies’ and their 
basis in Schelling’s Weltalter drafts. 
Goodchild repeats the three Schellingian potencies of experience as a relation between 
the past, present and future. He speaks of the Weltalter as ‘a dialectic of potencies [which] 
must describe the construction of modes of piety and their dissolution’67, concluding, ‘In 
addition to the dialectic driven by lack and contradiction, Schelling indicates that the will 
does not merely seek to overcome the past, but actively searches for the future.’68 At first 
glance, Goodchild’s reading of Schelling seems derivative of Žižek’s. Like Žižek69, 
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Goodchild makes much of the final page of the 1813 draft of the Weltalter: ‘The Eternal leads 
the force of the highest consciousness into unconsciousness and sacrifices it to externality so 
that there might be life and actuality.’70 This passage continues, 
 
This is how things had to stand if there were to be an eternal beginning, an eternal 
ground. That primordial deed which makes a man genuinely himself precedes all 
individual actions; but immediately after it is put into exuberant freedom, this deed 
sinks into the night of unconsciousness. This is not a deed that could happen once and 
then stop; it is a permanent deed, a never-ending deed, and consequently it can never 
again be brought before consciousness… This deed occurs once and then 
immediately sinks back into the unfathomable depths.
71
 
 
A hasty reading of Goodchild’s interpretation could easily identify piety with the Schellingian 
notion of ‘beginning’. Piety, like the past, is ineluctably suppressed and forgotten in modern 
thinking.
72
 The potency of the past, on this reading, is a transcendental condition of existence 
that makes life possible, but must equally necessarily be suppressed and pushed into the past 
for that life to be possible. A Žižekian Goodchild would claim: both the positing and negation 
of piety are necessary for the possibility of thought. As the future of thinking would depend 
on the suppression of all pieties, criticism in any form would become impossible. 
 The above already indicates why Goodchild cannot subscribe to this Žižekian reading 
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of the Weltalter and, indeed, he explicitly distances himself from Žižek.73 Goodchild does not 
identify piety with a necessarily suppressed and unavailable past; rather, as we have already 
seen, Goodchild identifies piety with the potency of the future. Moreover, he puts this 
Schellingian future of the third potency into battle with the capitalist future. So, on the one 
hand, there is that dead and empty vision of the future which asserts: 
 
To save time is to reinvest the time we spend on time itself. This reflexive intensifying 
process leaves little time to spare for other needs that demand our attention. The 
essence of contemporary ideology is a focused and self-enclosed attention: in 
focusing on expectations about future rates of return, extrapolated from limited 
processes in the present, and in focusing on saving time, one loses sight of reality.
74
 
 
And on the other hand there is a critical future that promises transformation through asking, 
in Schelling’s words: ‘Is [the future] not just that inner spiritual matter which still lies 
concealed in all things of this world, only awaiting its liberation?’75 And the key issue, of 
course, is how to construct the latter as resistance to the former.  
 
 
4. After the Deluge 
 
Goodchild, Tillich and Schelling all assert (in their own way) the following thesis: the future 
is born out of catastrophe. Crisis is a key theme in Schelling’s work from 1809 onwards. The 
Freiheitsschrift, for example, is intent on charting the eruption of grounds (whether 
geological, metaphysical, epistemological or religious). The history of religion sketched at 
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the end of this work follows the ultimate ground (or in Tillich’s vocabulary, ultimacy itself) as 
it recurs in more ideal forms, transforming itself into light, spirit and finally love.
76
 However, 
interspersed are a series of catastrophes. For example, ‘Because the principle of the depths 
can never give birth for itself to true and complete unity, the time comes in which all this 
glory decays as through horrible disease, and finally chaos again ensues’77, or again, 
 
At last there results the crisis in the turba gentium which overflow the foundations 
of the ancient world as once the waters of the beginning again covered the creations 
of primeval time.
78
 
 
History in the Freiheitsschrift incorporates a catastrophic flooding, or, in Grant’s words, ‘a 
geological eruption in the midst of the philosophy of freedom.’79 A philosophy of piety (a 
philosophy of the future) must concern itself with these catastrophes, these moments when 
piety as a suppressed transcendental condition is finally revealed. Put more prosaically, what 
matters most to us becomes particularly clear in a crisis: such is the commonplace assertion 
that Schelling’s geological ontology attempts to justify. 
A similar mapping of the catastrophic alternation of grounding and ungrounding 
dominates Schelling’s Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. 
Historical time, and so the very possibility of the future, is constructed through crisis (an 
unprethinkable event of separation). Moreover, in a prefiguring of Tillichian correlation, 
Schelling articulates this crisis in the dual discourses of objectivity and subjectivity. In 
addition to the constitution of separate nation-peoples through crisis (including references 
once more to a primordial great flood), such an event is also ‘a spiritual crisis that… occurred 
                                                 
76
 F.W.J. Schelling, Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (La Salle: Open 
Court, 1936), 56-8. 
77
 Ibid, 56. 
78
 Ibid, 57-8. 
79
 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006), 17. 
21 
 
in the foundation of human consciousness itself.’80 It ‘shake[s] consciousness in its principle, 
in its foundation’ as ‘a tremoring of consciousness itself’ (words that again recall Tillich’s 
description of revelation).
81
 
 Thus, the necessary condition of the possibility of a future for the subject and the 
world is a crisis. Out of crisis, the future emerges. What is more, for Schelling, language 
(particularly the language of mythology, i.e. divine names) is a privileged record of this 
coming into being of the future through catastrophe. It is ‘a body of unprethinkable human 
knowledge’.82 Hence, Schelling’s crucial assertion: ‘In the formation of the oldest languages 
a wealth of philosophy can be discovered.’83 Only through study of the crisis through which 
matters of ultimate concern are revealed can thought become adequate to itself, thereby 
intensifying the critical project; as the last words of the lecture course put it, the philosophy 
of mythology gives rise to ‘the power to expand philosophy and the philosophical 
consciousness itself or to determine them in an expansion beyond their current limits.’84 And 
so the task of a Schellingian critical theorist is to interrogate and test names, so as to confront 
the crisis anew and intensifying thought. 
 This is, in fact, precisely what Schelling undertakes to do in The Deities of 
Samothrace. The work consists in an investigation of the Greek mystery-cult native to the 
island of Samothrace; it asks why the gods of that cult were given the names they were and, 
for our purposes, what is key is the link Schelling establishes between a geological 
catastrophe and these divine names (naming gods, of course, being a particularly obvious 
example of the process of piety or manifesting ultimate concern
85
). 
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The work opens with a geological survey of the island which focuses in particular on 
a prehistoric flood (once more): 
 
Ancient geographers surmised that great convulsions of nature afflicted these 
regions even up to human times. It may be that the waters of the Black Sea, raised 
simply by flooding, first broke through the Thracian Strait, and then through the 
Hellespont. Or that the force of a subterranean volcano altered the level of the 
waters. The oldest Samothrace stories, transmuted into monuments exhibited in 
commemoration, preserved an account of this event, and from that time on they 
fostered the reverence and patronage of the native gods.
86
 
 
An eruption of geological grounds gave rise to a catastrophe (commemorated in ‘the oldest 
Samothrace stories’) which in turn triggered a new reverence for the divine among the people 
of Samothrace. The Samothracian mystery-cult, Schelling insists, was born from a ‘great 
convulsion of nature’ (the ‘turba gentium’ of the Freiheitsschrift). The critical stakes of this 
opening passage should now be clear: only in crises can the thinker gain access to grounds; 
only then can she ‘theologically unthink’. Moments of catastrophe – like the flooding of 
Samothrace – make possible a critical thinking attempting to identify its own conditions. 
Criticism must take any and all crises as its subject matter, including the flooding of 
Samothrace – and this is especially true when such catastrophe has already been 
commemorated and attested to in the religion of those affected by it. The founders of the 
Samothracian mystery-cults were κριτικόι par excellence, for, situated at the site of a crisis, 
they invented new forms of discourse and (most significantly) new pieties to bear witness to 
the ground which was made manifest to them. This is an archetype of criticism as such – and 
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it is perhaps for this reason that Schelling devotes a treatise to it. Schelling’s analysis of the 
Samothracian mystery-cult is a means of locating the pieties which had surfaced during the 
crisis. Thought only has a future if such pieties can be described, and such description is 
dependent upon thinking (as) catastrophe (as Schelling does here). To philosophically analyse 
divine names is to simultaneously reveal the workings of criticism itself: The Deities of 
Samothrace is ultimately a meta-philosophical enterprise. 
 
 
5. The Right to Name, or Back to Kant 
 
The above may seem to have strayed far from Tillich; however, an analysis of two quotations 
can rapidly show otherwise. First: 
 
One is enabled to speak of that which is most vital in the present, of that which makes 
the present a generative force, only insofar as one immerses oneself in the creative 
process which brings the future forth out of the past.
87
 
 
‘What is most vital in the present’ or what concerns us ultimately is constituted and attended 
to through a synthesis of time – in line with Goodchild’s assertion, ‘modes of piety are 
syntheses of time’.88 Past events bring forth the future, and it is only a thinking that submits 
itself to this temporal process (in parallel to, if not in identity with, its submission to crisis) 
which can genuinely be called critical. Indeed, Tillich even interprets Schelling (and 
particularly his Weltalter) through this very idea of ‘history viewed in light of the future.’89 
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Tillich’s Schelling is very much the Goodchildian Schelling of the third potency, just as 
Tillich’s critical project as a whole is one attentive to the future of thinking. 
 The second quotation is taken from Tillich’s typology of reason in the opening to 
Perspectives. Here he more than half-heartedly affirms the revolutionary power of ‘critical 
reason’:  
 
It was not a calculating reason which decides whether to do this or that, depending on 
which is more advantageous. Rather, it was a full, passionate, revolutionary emphasis 
on man’s essential goodness in the name of the principle of justice.90 
 
Tillich goes on to label it ‘revolutionary reason’91, and in so doing he links critique 
inextricably to the power to change the future, to reorient one’s ultimate concerns and to 
manage one’s pieties differently. In his invocations of justice and revolution, he also makes 
explicit a theme that has been bubbling under the surface of this essay from the very 
beginning: criticism and politics. And it is with this link that I want to conclude. 
 At stake here is the right or legitimacy by which the κριτικός accesses what is 
ultimate, names it and transforms it: from where does the κριτικός obtain this authority? It is, 
I am arguing, a matter of positioning. The κριτικός has the right to name what grounds and 
ungrounds experience because she stands in the position from which the ground is most 
accessible. It is a matter therefore of the proximity from which one confronts the crisis – that 
is, of politics. 
Criticism as such, I have argued, concerns itself with crises. It situates itself in limit-
experiences where piety (or the future) manifests itself. What orients thinking and acting only 
becomes clear in a crisis – and, as this principle of orientation is a key transcendental 
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condition, criticism is not criticism as such unless it thinks (in a) crisis. The κριτικός must 
seek out the crises in the turba gentium, because it is there that the future is manufactured. 
There is a danger here and it is a danger of which Kant in particular was acutely aware – the 
danger of proximity. A revolutionary, Kant implies, is not a critical thinker, because criticism 
necessitates distance from what is being described. That criticism which places itself too 
close to catastrophe can no longer be criticism. This danger Kant dubs, ‘fanaticism’.92 There 
are two related reasons why a revolutionary fanatic cannot be a κριτικός. First, the fanatic 
does not have the discursive distance to think about the crisis. In the midst of the crisis itself, 
there is no privileged position to describe its contents and to view the ground as it reveals 
itself. The fanatic is too close. Second, Kant writes, fanaticism ‘is the delusion of wanting to 
see something beyond all bounds of sensibility.’93 For our purposes, this is the error of 
impatience: instead of awaiting the emergence of the future in the crisis, the fanatic tries to 
realise it too quickly, to anticipate. The κριτικός must be patient. Such is what Goodchild 
designates ‘absolute faith’: ‘Absolute faith allows the future to be constituted as a gift of the 
potencies. Absolute faith waits.’94 
This poses a problem. Throughout this essay, I have argued that Kant did not go far 
enough; he did not practise criticism as such. Is his exclusion of the fanatic another example 
of this failure to cultivate criticism as such or should such critical thinking follow Kant in 
prohibiting the figure of the fanatic from critical thought? In fact, this question need not be 
answered head-on, for Kant himself offers a way out of this stark dichotomy by means of an 
additional concept – enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is a means to both participate in a revolution 
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and be critical. Enthusiasm for Kant ‘is a straining of our forces by ideas that impart to the 
mind a momentum whose effects are mightier and more permanent than are those of an 
impulse produced by presentations of sense.’95 It is ‘the state of mind in which it has become 
inflamed by any principle above the proper degree.’96 That is, enthusiasm is an excess of 
attention, a state in which ultimate concern becomes more manifest. Hence, for Kant, 
‘Nothing great in the world has been done without [enthusiasm].’97 History (the future) 
comes to pass only through enthusiasm (attention to what is ultimate) – a pattern that has 
been repeated throughout this essay. 
Toscano has recently drawn attention to the constructive role of enthusiasm in Kant’s 
political philosophy. Arguing against Arendt, Lyotard, Critchley and all those who see Kant 
as a philosopher of neutrality, an anti-enthusiast, Toscano develops the idea of the 
philosopher as partisan spectator from Kant’s writings on the French Revolution. Kant does 
not advise the philosopher (or indeed any enlightened citizen) to remain apathetic and 
indifferent to the events in France; instead, he recommends for any spectator regarding these 
events from afar to feel enthusiasm at what they see – and this enthusiasm reveals ‘a tendency 
and faculty in human nature for improvement.’98 Toscano continues, 
 
What allows these spectators’ affective participation in the good to serve as a sign of 
human progress is not their impartiality, but the very fact that, at the risk of 
persecution, they are taking sides for the revolution. It is not impartiality but 
partisanship that defines the universal import of political judgment… These are not 
disincarnate, objective spectators, judging in terms of a dispassionate vision of the 
whole; instead they embody a passionate yet disinterested partisanship… The 
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spectator ‘acts’ through the risky choice of public partisanship, and that what his 
enthusiasm signals towards is the very capacity of the human being to be a collective 
historical political agent.
99
 
 
The critical thinker is an enthusiastic partisan. While she is not a fanatic militant situated in 
the fray (so liable to the errors of immediacy and impatience), neither is she apathetic and 
unconcerned. She possesses discursive distance, yet still attends to the crisis. What is more, 
and here Kant is insistent, something more is revealed to this enthusiastic philosopher than 
would have otherwise been: enthusiasm reveals the human faculty for improvement. 
Amelioration is possible for the enthusiastic κριτικός, the thinker of the revolution or the 
catastrophe. At this point, Kant approaches Tillich, Schelling and Goodchild most closely. 
As a coda to this invocation of the politics of criticism or an extension of its cultural 
purview, one final work cited by Toscano must be brought in to enrich the problematic: 
Euclides da Cuhna’s Rebellion in the Backlands.100 What is remarkable about da Cuhna’s 
book is that it takes as its subject matter all the crises covered in this essay (and more) in the 
name of understanding the formation and orientation of a future political community. It is the 
synthesis of all attempts at criticism as such. Rebellion begins with an extensive geological 
survey of the relevant region of Brazil in the manner of Schelling’s Deities of Samothrace. As 
Toscano goes on to point out, ‘Geological violence seems to presage and prepare the 
apocalyptic politics.’101 Geological crises are also crises of politics and religion: in all three, 
the same pieties, the same concerns, the same future, are revealed. Moreover, da Cuhna 
explicitly invokes these links between politics, religion and geology in the name of prophecy 
– that is, in the name of the future. Rebellion sets itself the task of using these crises, 
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revolutions and catastrophes as means of uncovering the future for the people of Brazil. 
Brazil’s future is manufactured out of these past events, because in these events the ultimate 
concerns of Brazilian society is revealed. Just like Schelling in the Deities of Samothrace, da 
Cuhna ‘joins geology and millenarianism’102, and this eclectic carnival of genres, subject 
matters and concepts rearranged in the name of revealing what matters most should, it is my 
contention, be seen as akin to Tillich’s project and so be dubbed ‘critical philosophy as such’. 
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